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I h i s G )i II i si: 101 lid ;:: i n s ^ n " tin1 I n i l 11 ( "iininf s iv t i .ifier •^•\\ Mu ig 
that under Utah law; dismissal of a petition for an extraordinary writ on grounds of 
laches in a written opinion is a decision "on the merits" such, that later adjudication 
o" lie siiirii clam. '•• barred. "[Wjheri a court of competent jurisdiction has 
adjudicated directly upon a particular matter, the same point is not open to inquiry 
>i lbsequei it action foi 1:1: le san le cai lse at: id bet vv eei: 1 it: le sai lie par ties " " G ates t 
true regardless of whether the court directly adjudicates the plaintiffs substantive 
claims or "says"to the plaintiff 'you are too late.""" Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. i \ 
City of Chi —' ".2d 1 - R 1^3 (7lh H- 1987). In sillier ease, the decision 
"may be ' on the merits' for purposes of preclusion,' Id. 
I he FI DS Association urges the Court, to disregai, -uis precedent a; - , . 
that if a I J tall: I coi :i::i: t issues a \ v rittei i opii lion dismissing a petition foi e::: ;:: I* -
writ on grounds of laches, the preclusive effect depends on a number oi 
"circumstances," including whether the "laches determination is based on actual 
litigation of the underlying facts" in a "feet-finding coiirt," and whethe- a "\v\ic and 
thorough lacucs analysis was applied."'' I ""'I DS Bi 3 1 As explained i-elow =iK-se 
"circui i istai ices' ' f it id t 10 si lppoi t it: i tl le case law o:t: logic. ... ' .'. 
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Rather, it appears that the FLDS Association's multi-factor analysis is 
designed to obscure the fact that in Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of { 
Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ^|1, 238 P.3d 1054, this Court 
expressly held that the FLDS Association's constitutional claims were barred by < 
laches: "We hold that because the FLDS Association has delayed this challenge 
for nearly three years, and because during this time, many parties have engaged in 
i 
numerous transactions in reliance on the Trust's modification, the FLDS 
Association's trust modification claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of 
i 
laches." That this Court could have dismissed the petition on purely discretionary 
grounds, or, in the Association's view, should TW/Vhave found laches on the record 
here, is irrelevant to the preclusive effect of the decision. What is relevant is that 
this Court, after thorough consideration of the record and the Utah law of laches, 
actually did hold the FLDS Association's claims barred by laches. Nothing in the ( 
Court's laches analysis depended on the fact that the issue arose in the context of a 
petition for extraordinary writ. This Court cited the same case law, analyzed the 
same factors, and based its holding on the same considerations it would use if a 
question of laches arose in any other type of proceeding. Under these 
i 
"circumstances," this Court's finding of laches in Lindberg should not be subject to 
relitigation in federal court simply because it was issued in the context of an 
extraordinary writ proceeding. 
2 
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Indeed, the FLDS Association has failed to provide any logical reason why 
it—or any other plaintiff whose writ action has been dismissed on laches 
grounds—should be permitted to litigate its claim in successive actions. Laches 
and res judicata are both intended to promote repose and protect reliance interests. 
Allowing a tardy plaintiff to relitigate a claim that was barred by laches in an 
earlier writ action undermines these important public policies. Likewise, adopting 
the FLDS Association's proposed "general rule" limiting the preclusive effect of 
decisions made in the context of original actions would have far-ranging and 
negative consequences. It would effectively render a written decision by this Court 
denying a petition for extraordinary writ to be little more than an advisory opinion. 
ARGUMENT 
The FLDS Association's brief starts from the premise that this Court lacks 
"jurisdiction" to resolve the "preclusive effect" ofFundamentalist Church of Jesus 
1
 Compare, e.g., Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 566 (1890) ("The doctrine of 
laches is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires for the peace of 
society the discouragement of stale demands."), with Nevada v. United States, 463 
U.S. 110, 129 (1983) (res judicata "ensures 'the very object for which civil courts 
have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the 
settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is 
essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would 
not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if ... 
conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals.'") (omission in 
original); see also Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000) (stating that "the 
basic policies of all limitations provisions" is to provide "repose, elimination of 
stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiffs opportunity for recovery and a 
defendant's ... liability]."). 
3 
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Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054, and thus can 
only opine on "abstract" questions of law. FLDS Br. 4-7. Indeed, the FLDS i 
Association goes as far as saying this Court cannot even "discuss Lindberg at all." 
Id. at 7. i 
The FLDS Association does not seriously dispute that a prior decision 
dismissing a claim on laches grounds can be preclusive and that decisions by this 
Court in the context of a Rule 65B petition can be preclusive. .Id at 3-4, 14-15. 
The Association, however, contends the preclusive effect of the denial of a Rule 
{ 
65B petition depends on the "express terms" of the opinion and a number of 
"circumstances" that just happen to be present in this case and might be viewed as 
giving the Association grounds to return to the Tenth Circuit and argue that 
Lindberg does not bar its federal -action against Judge Lindberg and the Fiduciary. 
Id. at 2-4, 7-25. That results-oriented proposal should be rejected. As discussed i 
below, the FLDS Association misapprehends the scope of this Court's jurisdiction, 
and there is no justification for adopting its multi-factored res judicata test, 
regardless of whether the various factors are viewed in the abstract or as applied to 
the facts of this case. 
1. Notwithstanding the FLDS Association's assertion to the contrary, id. at 
7, this Court may answer the certified question with reference to the Lindberg 
decision. The Utah Supreme Court has "original jurisdiction to answer questions 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of state law certified by a court of the United States." Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-
102(1). To ensure that the Court has the information necessary to answer certified 
questions, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(c)(2) requires the certifying court 
to "set forth all facts which are relevant to the determination of the question 
certified and which show the nature of the controversy, the context in which the 
question arose, and the procedural steps by which the question was framed." 
Those requirements are met here. 
The question of the preclusive effect of Lindberg is undoubtedly a question 
of Utah law. Indeed, the FLDS Association conceded this point in the federal 
district court and agreed that if Lindberg "is considered to be on the merits for res 
judicata purposes" under Utah law, the federal courts are "bound by the Utah 
Supreme Court's finding of laches and must dismiss the case." Aplt.App.56. 
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit's certification order specifically discusses Lindberg 
and explains how that decision led the court to certify the question of the 
preclusive effect of a Utah court's denial of a petition for extraordinary writ on 
grounds of laches. See Order Certifying State Law Questions at 8-11, Doc. No. 
01018803969 (10th Cir, Mar. 2, 2012). There is, therefore, no jurisdictional bar or 
procedural rule preventing this Court from answering the certified question with 
reference to Lindberg or the particular facts of this case. Cf Shoemaker v. City of 
Bremerton, 745 P.2d 858, 859 (Wash. 1987) (deciding, on certification from the 
5 
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( 
Ninth Circuit, whether ^Washington law affordfs] preclusive effect to the factual 
findings of the Bremerton Civil Service Commission that Joe Shoemaker's * 
reductions in rank were not retaliatory"). 
Nor is there any prudential reason for this Court to answer the certified < 
question at an abstract level of generality that could result in additional disputes 
about the scope of Utah law on this issue. It does not "promot[e] efficiency, or 
otherwise serv[e] the objectives of the question certification process/5 for this 
Court to return "an answer to the federal court which all concerned know" will 
spawn "additional state law questions." Miller v. United States, 2004 UT 96, ^ |8, 
.104 P.3d 1202. u 
The question certification procedure represents a unique 
exercise of [this Court's] original jurisdiction. Unlike . . . traditional 
appellate review, [the Court is] not presented with a decision to affirm ^ 
or reverse. Instead, [it is] being approached for guidance. [The 
Court] should respond to these requests guided by a desire to provide -•< 
meaningful and comprehensive assistance which, under certain 
circumstances, may require a more expansive answer than a literal 
reading of the certified question may warrant. 
Id 110. 
The need for guidance is particularly acute here because there are several 
cases pending in state and federal courts that raise a similar question about the 
preclusive effect of Lindberg.2 Litigation challenging the constitutionality of the 
2
 See, e.g., Wisan v. City of Hildale, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20100993 
(filed Dec. 12, 2012) (challenging the Special Fiduciary's authority to subdivide 
6 
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reformation of the UEP Trust has been costly and time-consuming for all 
concerned. A decision about the preclusive effect of Lindberg itself would 
promote efficiency and enhance the ability of Utah courts to make final 
determinations about the control and disposition of the Trust's assets. 
2. The FLDS Association's primary argument is that, as a "[g]eneral [r]ule," 
"[d]enials of extraordinary writs do not preclude subsequent litigation of the 
underlying substantive claims." FLDS Br. 7. That argument, however, is 
inconsistent with this Court's holding in Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, ff 1-2, 997 
P.2d 903, that where a petition for extraordinary writ is denied in a written opinion 
that "is clear that the matter was decided on the merits," the "petitioners are barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata from seeking the same relief from another court. 
Trust land); In re United Effort Plan Trust, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 
20090691 (filed Aug. 27, 2009) (challenging Judge Lindberg's denial of motions 
by FLDS members to intervene in the probate proceedings to challenge the impact 
of the Trust reformation and administration); Colorado City v. United Effort Plan 
Trust, No. 3:ll-cv-08037-DGC (D. Ariz., filed Mar. 11, 2011) (Colorado City 
seeking a declaration that the reformation of the Trust was unconstitutional and 
therefore the Special Fiduciary has no authority to administer Trust land in 
Colorado City and the City has no obligation to deal with him or residents of Trust 
land occupying homes pursuant to an occupancy agreement negotiated with the 
Special Fiduciary); Cooke et al v. Colorado City, et al, No. 3:10-cv-08105-JAT 
(D. Ariz., filed June 24, 2010) (Colorado City defending lawsuit by the State of 
Arizona and Ron and Jinjer Cooke for the refusal of Colorado City to provide 
water to the Cookes on the ground that the Trust reformation was unconstitutional 
and the Special Fiduciary had no authority to enter into the occupancy agreement 
at issue); Jessop v. Wisan, S-8015-cv-20082047 Sup. Ct. Mohave Cnty. Ariz, (filed 
Nov. 7, 2008) (FLDS members challenging the sale of Trust property on the 
grounds that the reformation of the Trust is unconstitutional). 
7 
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< 
The FLDS Association apparently recognizes this point, because elsewhere in its 
brief it asserts (without any discussion or reasoning) that Gates is limited to its 
facts—namely, to cases in which the petitioner files a successive Rule 65B 
petition. See FLDS Br. 3-4. 
Gates cannot be read so narrowly. Using reasoning that contradicts the 
FLDS Association's cramped reading, this Court emphasized that u[s]ound policy, 
principles of judicial economy, and fairness to the parties require that final 
judgments on the merits be subject only to proper appellate review and not to 
successive relitigation in new courts." Gates, 2000 UT 33, ^[3, 997 P.2d 903 
(emphasis added). This Court went on to hold that "fwjhen a court of competent 
jurisdiction has adjudicated directly upon a particular matter, the same point is not 
open to inquiry in a subsequent action for the same cause and between the same 
parties" Id. (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). Thus nothing in Gates—or 
logic—supports the FLDS Association's assertion that the dismissal of a writ on 
the merits bars relitigation of the claim or issue only in a successive Rule 65B 
petition, but not in a different type of action. 
3
 The FLDS Association's observation (at 13) that the Utah Constitution no longer 
requires this Court to issue a written opinion when it enters judgment on the merits 
supports our position here. By issuing a thorough, written opinion in a context 
where it was under no obligation to do so, this Court clearly demonstrated that it 
had "adjudicated directly upon a particular matter" such that "the same point is not 
open to inquiry in a subsequent action for the same cause and between the same 
parties." Gates, 2000 UT 33, p , 997 P.2d 903. 
8 
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The FLDS Association also suggests that its position is consistent with the 
majority rule in other courts, but the treatise that it cites (at 10) establishes the very 
opposite point. 
Disposition of requests for relief by injunction or extraordinary writ 
poses few distinctive preclusion problems. All that is required is 
careful attention to the nature of the initial proceeding and the basis of 
decision. 
18A Wright, Miller, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 2002), §4445; 
see also E. T. Tsai, Annotation, Judgment Granting or Denying Writ of Mandamus 
or Prohibition as Res Judicata, 21 A.L.R. 3d 206 §2 (it is "well settled that the 
doctrine of res judicata is applicable to judgments in mandamus and prohibition 
proceedings") (footnotes omitted). As our opening brief explains, numerous courts 
have given preclusive effect to decisions made in the context of extraordinary writ 
actions, where, like here, there is a written opinion showing that the Court 
"adjudicated directly" a disputed claim or issue. Wisan-Lindberg Br. 36-37 (citing 
cases). 
3. The FLDS Association does not seriously dispute that courts have given 
preclusive effect to decisions holding a claim barred by laches (or, relatedly, by an 
applicable statute of limitations, failure to prosecute or undue delay). Instead, the 
FLDS Association contends that a laches determination made by an "appellate" 
court (rather than a "trial" court) cannot be given res judicata effect. FLDS Br. 11-
12. According to the FLDS Association, laches is "a question of fact" and an 
Q 
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appellate court cannot make the necessary factual findings. Id. This contention is 
unavailing. i 
a. When this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals rules on a Rule 65B 
petition for an extraordinary writ, it exercises its original jurisdiction. See Gates, i 
2000 UT 33, f3, 992 P.2d 903. In such cases, the Court may consider the evidence 
presented by the parties in support of the petition and opposition, as well as the 
record of the judicial proceeding for which the writ is sought, and make the factual 
findings necessary for its decision. See, e.g., Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, 
1ff[2-7, 149 P.3d 352 (making factual findings about a district court's general 
practice concerning preservation of affidavits used to obtain search warrants and 
the steps it took to preserve the affidavit in Anderson's particular case). Indeed, in 
holding that there is no statute of limitations for Rule 65B petitions, but that a 
petition may be dismissed on grounds of laches, Renn v. Utah State Bd. of 
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995), this Court necessarily determined that 
appellate courts can make the factual determinations necessary to determine 
whether the laches criteria are met. There is, therefore, no basis for the FLDS 
Association's assertion that this Court's dismissal of a petition for extraordinary 
writ on grounds of laches has no preclusive effect because the "facts underlying the 
laches defense were not litigated." FLDS Br. 3,12. 
10 
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b. To the extent the FLDS Association implies that it did not have the 
opportunity to contest disputed factual issue relevant to this Court's laches finding, 
FLDS Br. 12, such an assertion is patently incorrect. The FLDS Association chose 
to file the Rule 65B action and to stay its federal district court action pending this 
Court's resolution of that petition. If the FLDS Association had thought there were 
disputed issues of material fact that could not properly be resolved in an original 
action, it should not have brought the petition or, at a minimum, should have made 
that argument in the writ action and sought rehearing of this Court's decision. The 
FLDS Association cannot avoid the consequences of its prior litigation strategy by 
resorting to "successive litigation in new courts." Gates, 2000 UT 33, p , 997 P.2d 
903; see also, e.g., Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustments, 2002 UT 77, f20, 52 
P.3d 1267 (litigants who fail to appeal adverse judgments "are bound by the 
judgment and may not relitigate an issue they already had an opportunity to 
litigate").4 
In any event, the FLDS Association does not assert that it was unable to 
offer relevant evidence to support its petition for extraordinary writ. Nor has it 
identified any disputed issue of material fact that this Court improperly resolved. 
This Court had the benefit of the record of the underlying probate proceedings, cf 
Likewise incorrect is the FLDS Association alternative suggestion that as an 
original action this Court's decision in Lindberg did not make any factual findings. 
Compare FLDS Br. 12, with 2010 UT 51, ffl[30-35, 238 P.3d 1054. 
11 
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FLDS Br. 12, and the FLDS Association does not—and cannot—dispute that its 
members were on notice of the reformation of the Trust by Judge Lindberg yet 
waited nearly three years before seeking to challenge the decision. See Lindberg, 
2010 UT 51, Tf30, 238 P.3d 1054. Indeed, counsel for the FLDS Association < 
effectively conceded that point to this Court. Aplt.App.4119, 4127-4129. 
Likewise, the FLDS Association does not dispute that third-parties, such as the 
original Tort Plaintiffs, relied on the reformation of the Trust and that no party 
appealed that decision. See Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ffl[33-34, 238 P.3d 1054. The 
FLDS Association simply disagrees with this Court's legal conclusion that these 
factsdemonstrate laches. 
This is confirmed by the FLDS Association's reliance on the federal district 
court's critique of the Lindberg decision. FLDS Br. 18-20. The federal district 
court held noevidentiary hearing before rejecting this Court's findings that laches < 
should apply in these circumstances. See Aplt.App.1-21. Further, the federal 
district court did not dispute any of this Court's core factual findings that the FLDS 
Association had notice of the Trust reformation and that third parties reasonably 
relied on that reformation when it was not appealed. Rather, the federal district 
court found that such facts were insufficient to establish laches because of the 
potential "merits" of the FLDS Association's constitutional claims and because the 
"tort lawsuit settlements certainly can be dealt with by the same legal system one 
12 
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would expect to be able to allow these plaintiffs to somewhere obtain a ruling on 
the merits of their constitutional claims." Aplt.App.55, 61-42. That the FLDS 
Association and the district court disagree with Lindberg is not a sufficient reason 
for denying it preclusive effect. 
4. In another variation on the same theme, the FLDS Association asserts 
that courts have adopted "the general rule that laches dismissals lack preclusive 
effect unless they fully litigate the merits." FLDS Br. 15; see also id. at 4 
(dismissal on laches ground should be considered to have preclusive effect only if 
the second court concludes, after "careful[] analy[sis]," that the original decision 
undertook a "true and thorough laches analysis," including the merits of plaintiff s 
Underlying claim). Again, no such "general rule" exists. 
a. It is well-established that a judgment based on an affirmative defense 
may be "on the merits" for purposes of res judicata even though it did not consider 
the "merits" of plaintiffs substantive claims. As we demonstrated in our opening 
brief (at 27-28), although a judgment must be "'on the merits'" to bar subsequent 
litigation of the same claim between the same parties, it is a "misconception of res 
judicata to assume that the doctrine does not come into operation if a court has not 
passed on the 'merits' in the sense of the ultimate substantive issues of a 
litigation." Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947). Rather, "[a]n 
adjudication declining to reach such ultimate substantive issues may bar a second 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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attempt to reach them in another court of the State/' because the "'merits' of a 
claim are disposed of when [they are] refused enforcement." Id. . * 
Thus, courts have routinely applied res judicata to prior decisions finding a 
claim barred by statute of limitations or laches without "carefully analyzing]" < 
whether the original court engaged in a "true and thorough" analysis of the 
"merits" of the plaintiffs substantive claims, See, e.g., Smith v. City of Chi, 820 
F.2d 916, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1987); Am. Nat'I Bank & Trust, 826 F.2d at 1553; 
Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chi, 784 F.2d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 1986); Rose v. Town 
of Harwich, 778 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.); State v. Cahoon, 2009 UT 
9, f 14, 203 P.3d 957. If a court says to the plaintiff "'you are too late' or otherwise 
wraps up a case in a way that indicates that the plaintiff has irrevocably failed," the 
decision "may be 'on the merits' for purposes of preclusion even though the court 
did not resolve the merits" of the plaintiff s underlying claim. Am. Nat'l Bank & { 
Trust, 826 F.2d at 1553; see also Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, |14, 203 P.3d 957 (res 
judicata can bar relitigation of a claim dismissed on statute of limitations grounds). 
Notably, the FLDS Association does not explain why its proposed rule 
would make sense, and, as we explained in our opening brief, it does not. Wisan-
i 
Lindberg Br. 27-33. If courts were to relax principles of res judicata whenever 
they thought a litigant had a strong claim on the merits, the doctrine "would fail to 
serve its purposes of promoting judicial economy and repose." Rose, 778 F.2d at 
14 
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82; see also FederatedDep't. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398-99 (1981) 
(relitigation of the correctness of the original decision "undermine[s] . . . the very 
purpose of the doctrine of res judicata"). A defendant with a valid affirmative 
defense should not be forced to incur the unnecessary and inappropriate costs of 
litigating the substantive merits of the underlying claims in another lawsuit. 
Indeed, it would make no sense to weigh the "merits" of a plaintiffs claim 
in assessing the preclusive effect of a dismissal based on an affirmative defense 
that applies regardless of the potential merits of the claim. See infra n.5. For 
example, it would be completely illogical to ask whether the original court gave 
sufficient attention to the "merits" of claims held barred by the statute of 
limitations. The FLDS Association offers no explanation why a different rule 
should apply to the related concept of laches, which serves an analogous function 
to statutes of limitations in the context of petitions for an extraordinary writ. Renn, 
904 P.2d at 684. And, unsurprisingly, as we previously demonstrated, the two 
cases cited by the FLDS Association for its supposed "general rule" do not 
announce a different standard. Wisan-Lindberg Br. 33 & n.8. 
b. The FLDS Association's theory seems to rest on the notion that a Utah 
court must consider and weigh the "merits" of a plaintiffs underlying claim in 
determining whether laches applies. FLDS Br. 4, 15. But even if this Court's 
precedents prohibited a dismissal on laches grounds unless the merits of the 
is 
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% 
plaintiffs substantive claims were discussed in the opinion—and it does not appear 
to impose any such requirement5—whether a decision dismissing a claim on laches 
grounds correctly analyzed the merits of the plaintiffs claim is legally irrelevant to 
whether the decision has preclusive effect.6 The "res judicata consequences" of a { 
final judgment are not "altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong -
" Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 398; see also, e.g., Collins, 2002 UT 
77, [^18, 52 P.3d 1267 (same). To the extent that the original court made a legal 
error (here, in the FLDS Association's view, the putative failure of this Court in 
Lindberg to give proper weight to the "merits" of the Association's constitutional 
claims, FLDS Br. 4), the remedy is to raise that argument to the original court or 
on review, not to relitigate the issue or claim in another court. Federated Dep't 
Stores, 452 U.S. at 398-401; Collins, 2002 UT 77, ^19, 52 P.3d 1267. The 
• > > • • • • - - — • • • • • " 
As Lindberg itself determined, "laches has two elements: (1) a party's lack of 
diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence." Lindberg, 2010 
UT 51, ^ {27, 238 P.3d 1054; see also Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 
P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) ("To constitute laches, two elements must be 
established: (1) The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; [and] (2) An injury to 
defendant owing to such lack of diligence.'") (alteration in original) (quoting 
Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 
1260 (Utah 1975)). Laches is an equitable doctrine developed to discourage stale 
claims and protect reliance interests even where a plaintiffs claims may be 
potentially meritorious. See supra p. 3. 
6
 Notably, although Lindberg did not specifically discuss the relative strength of 
the FLDS Association's constitutional claims, its laches analysis appeared to 
assume arguendo those claims were potentially meritorious. See 2010 UT 51, ^|26, 
238 P.3d 1054. 
16 
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Association's contrary rule would "upset the general and well established doctrine 
of res judicata, conceived in the light of the maxim that the interest of the state 
requires that there be an end to litigation—a maxim which comports with common 
sense as well as public policy." Collins, 2002 UT 77, ^fl9, 52 P.3d 1267 
(quotations omitted). 
5. Finally, the FLDS cannot avoid the preclusive effect of Lindberg by 
contending that the reformation of the Trust violated "structural" prohibitions of 
the Establishment Clause and that such violations can never be barred by laches. 
FLDS Br. 21-25. This argument is first and foremost an impermissible attempt to 
avoid the preclusive effect of a prior decision by arguing that it is incorrect. As 
previously noted, see supra p. 16, "'an erroneous conclusion reached by the court 
in the first suit does not deprive the defendants in the second action of the right to 
rely upon the plea of res judicata.'" Collins, 2002 UT 77, f 18,- 52 P.3d 1267 
(quoting FederatedDep yt Stores, 452 U.S. at 398). 
In addition, this argument was necessarily rejected by the Tenth Circuit 
when it certified the state law question to this Court. Before the Tenth Circuit, the 
FLDS Association defended the preliminary injunction issued by the federal 
district court by arguing that its Establishment Clause claims could not be barred 
by laches (or otherwise waived). See Brief of FLDS at 16, Doc. No. 01018736073 
(10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2011). Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit certified to this Court 
17 
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the question of the preclusive effect of the dismissal of a petition for extraordinary 
writ on grounds of laches. Because certification is proper only if a question of 
Utah law is "a controlling issue of law in a proceeding pending before the 
certifying court," Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(B), the Tenth Circuit could not have 
certified the question of the preclusive effect of a dismissal on the grounds of 
laches if, as the FLDS Association now argues, laches cannot bar Establishment 
Clause claims. See Order Certifying State Law Questions at 8, 14-15, Doc. No. 
1018803969 (issuing the certification order pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 41); see also id. at 8 ("The resolution of this question of Utah law will 
likely control the outcome in appeals pending before our court."). 
In all events, the FLDS Association is wrong that the reformation of the 
Trust violated the Establishment Clause arid that claims alleging Establishment 
Clause violations cannot be barred if untimely, 
a. It is well established that constitutional challenges are barred if untimely. 
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 1998) (constitutional 
claims barred by statute of limitations); Souths ide Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of 
New York, 928 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1991) (Establishment Claim barred by laches); 
Perry v. Judd, 2012 WL 113865, at *6-7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2012), affd, 2012 WL 
120076 (4th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) (First and Fourteenth Amendment claims barred by 
laches). The FLDS Association cannot avoid this result by asserting that an 
18 
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Establishment Clause violation "cannot be cured by the passage of time." FLDS 
Br. 22. In Hair v. United States, 350 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2003), plaintiffs 
attempted to bring untimely taking claims by similarly arguing that "if Congress 
lacks the constitutional power to take private property without paying for it, how 
can it suddenly get the power after six years or any other designated period of 
elapsed time?" The Federal Circuit rejected the argument for reasons that are 
equally applicable here: American law has long recognized that "a plaintiff cannot 
sleep on his or her rights, and then suddenly demand a remedy, without creating a 
greater wrong against the party charged, and a wrong against the peace of the 
community." Id. at 1256. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "[a] 
constitutional claim can become time-barred just as any other claim can. Nothing 
in the Constitution requires otherwise." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 292 
(1983) (citations omitted). 
b. The FLDS Association's argument also assumes that it has stated a viable 
Establishment Clause violation. It has not. The First Amendment does not require 
the probate court to ignore the cy pres doctrine, Utah Code Ann. §75-7-413, or to 
sanction, in contravention of Utah law, id. §75-7-106, the inequitable result of 
allowing "the President of the FLDS Church, who violated his fiduciary duties to 
thousands of potential Trust beneficiaries, to benefit (directly or indirectly) from 
assets consecrated by those individuals as part of their personal quest for 
1 O 
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sanctification," Aplt.App.1590 n.86. To the contrary, a State is "constitutionally 
entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church 
property dispute." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). As was done here, 
such "neutral-principles approach" permits a court to resolve a church property 
dispute through the application of "well-established concepts of trust and property 
law." Id. at 603; see also Synanon Found., Inc. v. California, 444 U.S. 1307, 1307-
08 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (stay denial). 
Indeed, more than a century ago the Supreme Court upheld Congress's 
legislative use of the cypres doctrine to seize property of a church that engaged in 
unlawful acts and to use the property for secular charitable purposes chosen by the 
government. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-52 (1890). The seizure of church property in that 
case, the Court later explained, was "bottomed on the general rule that where a 
charitable corporation is dissolved for unlawful practices, the sovereign takes and 
distributes the property according to the cy-pres doctrine to objects of charity." 
Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 120 
(1952) (citations omitted). "A failure of the charitable purpose could have the 
same effect." Id. Thus, the probate court's application of the cy pres doctrine to 
modify the Trust to further only its legitimate charitable purpose and not illegal 
acts was consistent with Supreme Court precedent and "cannot be said to 'inhibit' 
id 
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the free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law 
governing the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or 
purchase goods." Jones, 443 U.S. at 606. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that under Utah law, dismissal of a petition for an 
extraordinary writ on grounds of laches in a written opinion is a decision "on the 
merits" such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred. Accordingly, this 
Court should further confirm that its decision in Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P3d 1054, was on the 
merits and that no party or privity of any party can relitigate any claim that was or 
could have been raised in that matter. 
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